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Abstract 
The modern state of translation in the United States and other English speaking countries 
is a system of domestication, in which the foreign elements in a translated work are removed or 
subdued for the sake of the target audiences.  This approach is based on a humanist perspective 
that believes languages to be simply different ways to communicate the same ideas.  A humanist 
view such as this is logically untenable because language defines concepts; it does not simply 
communicate them.  Not only is the logic informing domesticating practices unsound, but this 
approach also has significant cultural and political implications.  Domesticating translations 
contribute to the cultural imperialism that English speaking countries are exerting on the rest of 
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, 2001, there has been a push in the United States for an improved 
education and understanding of foreign language and culture.  The attacks and subsequent 
struggles with organizing a response revealed to many people in the government and military the 
depth and import of America’s woefully inadequate understanding of other cultures, and the 
individual groups within them.  In response to this revelation, the government has begun to 
increasingly emphasize the study of language and culture, and many non-governmental 
organizations have mirrored this change.  However, the absence of any significant change in 
America’s approach to translation over the past decade suggests that this overhaul may be purely 
superficial; that America’s treatment of the foreign has been updated for efficiency and 
effectiveness but remains the same in motive and perspective. 
The motive, as always, seems to be the ability to handle another culture, but not to 
understand and certainly not to empathize with it.  Even more concerning, the perspective is 
nearly always the foreign in the terms of the domestic.  For decades, the United States, and other 
English speaking countries as well, have favored a style of translation in which readability and 
comprehensibility in English are emphasized, rather than adherence to the original.  
Comprehensibility is not limited to just the language either, but extends to injecting the cultural 
tropes of the target audience into the text, so that the English speaking audiences can recognize 
something of themselves in what they are led to believe is the foreign.  This perspective is 
indicative of America’s treatment of the Other in a variety of contexts because there is always an 
element of translation in any interaction between two disparate groups.  The English speaking 
world powers are effectively acting on some illusory idea of Anglo-humanism (to coin a term), 
Brewer 6 
thinking that every group shares some linguistic and cultural foundation with themselves.  There 
is little evidence to support this assumption; it stems more from blind ethnocentrism than from 
any thoughtful analysis of difference and similarity. 
In this thesis, I first devote significant space to building a logical argument to call into 
question, and perhaps refute, this particular notion of humanism.  Structurally, this theoretical 
portion of the thesis progresses in specific steps, each step building on the previous ones.  These 
steps are divided into labeled sections for clarity and the convenience of the reader.  A 
significant portion of the argument is devoted to refuting the traditional idea that a translator’s 
goal is to find the words and phrases that reproduce the reaction of the “original readership.”  I 
begin by discussing in depth why there is no contiguous entity constituting an original 
readership, and even if there was one, why its reaction would not be imitable in the readership of 
another culture.  The initial steps in arguing this idea seemingly have little to do with translation, 
but they provide the philosophical foundation upon which the entire argument rests.  Following 
this section, I discuss why authorial intent is an equally poor standard upon which to base a 
translation.  My counter-proposition is that one should translate for the text itself, in all of its 
intricacies.  This approach entails an extremely literal translation because every element of the 
original contributes to its nature as an entity; therefore, every element is indispensable for the 
perfect transfer of meaning to the foreign language.  Of course, the preservation of every element 
is absolutely impossible, so the perfect translation is impossible.  I would go so far as to say that 
nearly every element of a text could not be preserved in translation, so even an adequate 
translation is impossible.  This impossibility does not mean that translation should not occur; it 
is, after all, indispensable to the modern world.  The translator should simply attempt to preserve 
the original to the best of his or her ability, knowing that success is quite out of reach. 
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After my discussion on the philosophy of language, I provide some examples of various 
translated works juxtaposed with their originals, and often different translations of the same 
work.  The purpose of this thesis is not to provide a comprehensive definition and set of 
examples of what constitutes a good or bad translation choice.  The determination of the quality 
of a certain choice is far too case specific, and relative to other choices, to allow for broad 
generalization.  Rather, I try to give a few examples of choices that are better or worse than 
others, more for the illustration of my theoretical arguments than for the construction of a rule 
book for translation.  I include a few translations, such as the Middle English of The Canterbury 
Tales, that are exceptions to the standard work because they inform and elucidate the practices of 
translation as a whole.  All of the specific examples should be understood as illustrative or 
explanatory of the theory that preceded them. 
Finally, the thesis concludes with an analysis of the consequences and implications of 
Americans’ current views on translation.  There can be no doubt that America exerts an 
ethnocentric and culturally imperialistic influence on the rest of the world.  Translation practices 
are only one manifestation of this covert imperialism, but they both inform and reveal the others.  
Cultural and linguistic variety across the planet is in decline, and it is not a stretch to link that 
destruction with American imperialism.  English is by far the language most translated out of, 
and English speaking countries translate very few works into English (Venuti 14).  There is 
clearly an imbalance of cultural exchange, which would certainly contribute to the diminished 
cultural variety.  I believe that this largely ignored issue is of the highest importance.  The 
homogenization of humanity is horrifying; consider the prevalence of dystopian novels, in which 
a homogenous populace is a primary characteristic of the disturbing culture.  Diversity is an 
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invaluable attribute of human beings, and American translation practices must be radically 
updated or reconfigured to help ensure that this diversity is not lost. 
Part 1: Theory 
1.1  
There is an expression, often used in political science or anthropological contexts, that 
states, “There is no great blue heron.”  This means that there does not exist a singular entity that 
embodies the concept of a great blue heron, but rather that humans categorize a large number of 
unique individuals under the label of great blue heron.  We can break down this label in an effort 
to find the fundamental essence of what we call “great blue heronness.”  That term encompasses 
a large number of individual birds, and each bird is different from the next in a wide variety of 
ways, so already we begin to see the multiplicity inherent in such a singular label.  If each 
individual is separate and different in this way, we must begin to examine what exactly it is 
about the nature of these birds as a collective that inclines us to classify them under the eaves of 
a single term or name.  Upon being asked that question, the vast majority of people would 
quickly reply that it is one or several of the many similarities common to all of them that makes 
possible their categorization under one label. 
Biologists, and indeed many laypeople, would proffer the traditional notion that the 
members of a species are defined as such by their ability to reproduce, and have fertile offspring, 
with each other.  This initially seems to be a valid definition of what constitutes a great blue 
heron and all other species as well, but this definition is by no means universally agreed upon.  
For example, some biologists argue that one should determine species by tracing some common 
ancestry rather than by the ability to reproduce.  Without going any further into biology, one can 
see that the system of classification for species, one of the most rigorously and scientifically 
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defined terms, is not an inherent or natural attribute of the collectives that we name species.  
While a group of entities may share characteristics, the particular characteristics that we select to 
unite these individuals under one name are the result of an arbitrary human decision.  The label is 
by no means self-evident; there is no reason why we could not classify blue herons according to 
beak length, geographic location, or appearance on the Discovery Channel in the year 1999.  
There is an effectively infinite set of traits common to a variety of entities that could be used to 
dictate classification; the selection of one out of those endless possibilities is an indiscriminate 
human process. 
The diagram below should serve to help illustrate the concepts discussed above. Each 
point represents an individual entity. It is important to note that any physical separation seen in 
the diagram is the result of random scattering.  It has no significance regarding any similarity 
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This rather crude illustration is an attempt to show what has previously been mentioned, 
that people define classification in terms of relative similarity according to arbitrary standards.  
These classifications are by no means necessarily fixed.  For example, as the diagram shows, the 
English language has a term for a group of entities called great blue herons, as well as a term for 
the group of entities called birds, into which the great blue herons also fall.  A given language 
will contain innumerable overlapping categories; under the term bird, for instance, there are 
labels for songbirds and shorebirds, and within the shorebird label are herons, and then Blue 
Herons are contained within that name.  Yet, even this incomprehensibly intricate system of 
labeling cannot begin to cover the possibilities for naming contained within the entities 
themselves.  Referring back to the diagram, there are two classes circled that do not have their 
own term, blue objects and objects in Maryland.  There is no inherent reason why English should 
not have terms for these two categories, but it does not.  The potential places to draw 
distinguishing or categorizing lines are essentially infinite, and therefore, within a language the 
locations of the divisions between concepts are arbitrary human inventions. 
1.2 
We have established that individual entities are not classified according to a natural set of 
distinctions, and a result of that logic, the typical human notion of what constitutes an entity is 
equally baseless.  The entities that people consider to be contiguous are undergoing constant 
flux, which calls into question the validity of describing an ever-changing object with only one, 
unchanging label.  Returning to the great blue heron example, if one such bird were to lose a 
feather, or chip its beak, it would still be considered a heron despite being different, which feeds 
into a traditional nihilistic argument.  One can strip away parts of a heron until there is nothing 
left, and somewhere along the way we will have stopped calling it a heron; but upon further 
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examination, we will not be able to determine the precise point at which the heron could no 
longer be called a heron.  This scenario, a variation of the heap paradox, serves to illustrate that 
what we refer to as an entity is really a spectrum of unique snapshots taken at every instant in 
time, chronicling the variation of that perceived entity.  So again, naming becomes a matter of 
categorizing a vast number of individual entities under a single label, according to a criterium 
that is not inherent to that which is named, and is often not even discernible to those performing 
the naming.  In short, a title such as “great blue heron” is an arbitrary classification of a group of 
unique entities, and each of those unique entities is an arbitrary classification of yet another 
group of unique entities. 
When considering the categorization of an entity, the case of proper names merits 
discussion, if just for its presence in historic writings on the nature of the sign.  In the Abrahamic 
religious tradition, the Adamic Language, or the Language of Eden, contained proper names for 
every physical object, the true name of every entity.  Every unique heron, and every other 
physical entity for that matter, had its own unique name.  For the sake of discussion, one can 
extend this system of proper names to abstract entities as well, creating a language of proper 
names.  French Algerian philosopher Jacques Derrida devoted much discussion to the 
untranslatability of the proper name, because he believed that a proper name was an exact title, 
unlike the approximations that are other words, whose signifieds and signifiers are arbitrarily 
connected.  He writes, “a proper name as such remains forever untranslatable,” because the term 
would be the same in every language (Des Tours 171).  Of course, traditional proper names often 
became less than proper as they came to stand for, or apply to, things beyond the original 
singular entity (the name Hitler, for example, now typically evokes an image of evil as well as 
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representing the man himself), but that detail, as well as the whole question of the proper name, 
is irrelevant here because proper names in the traditional sense do not exist.   
As previously discussed, the individual entities that could normally be labeled with a 
proper name are not distinct entities at all, but just another arbitrary collection of entities.  A true 
proper name can only apply to those individual instances that comprise what we traditionally 
consider to be a contiguous entity.  By virtue of this lack of inherent existence, entities, as we 
construe them, cannot have a true name, a perfect title that escapes human arbitrariness.  It is the 
divide between the unnatural human concepts in languages that “at the same time imposes and 
forbids translation,” as Derrida writes in “Des Tours de Babel” (Des Tours 170).  In other words, 
it is the variety of invented human concepts within and between languages that requires and 
allows for translation, but also prevents the ideal transfer of meaning.  Those constructed 
concepts define language, and more importantly perception, to the extent that every known 
individual entity only exists as the product of human artifice, and the variety permitted by this 
artificiality is what causes as well as precludes translation. 
I would say more specifically that the artificiality of concepts makes them fluid, 
susceptible to change or difference.  Changeable in the sense that the meaning of a term evolves 
over time, and different in the sense that perfect correspondence between two labels in disparate 
languages is always impossible.  As already stated, proper names refer to concepts as unspecific 
and therefore fluid as all other labels, so they are as translatable as anything else.  This certainly 
seems counterintuitive, especially when one considers that people do not typically translate their 
own names when communicating in a different language, so this statement merits further 
explanation.  Take a traditional proper name, John Smith (for the sake of unoriginality), for 
example.  This name applies to a set or spectrum of unique, instantaneous entities, and through 
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time this set accumulates more and more of these momentary John Smiths.  This accumulation 
means that the signifier John Smith is being applied to an ever changing signified.  To put more 
generally, the object that the “proper name” John Smith is referring to is in constant flux, so it 
should be subject to translation.  That title can signify very different things at different points in 
time, so in order to properly express this meaning, one would need to translate it.  Of course, we 
do not often translate proper names, but that does not mean that those names cannot be subject to 
translation.  We just satisfy ourselves with imperfect transmission of meaning or significance as 
we do in so many other ways.  The translation of proper names does occur however, in mundane 
but not necessarily obvious ways; for example, the person’s official name changes when he 
receives a doctorate, and becomes Dr. John Smith.  Perhaps more commonly, a person’s referent 
can change as their context changes.  A young child named Johnny might grow into John, and 
then become John Sr. upon having children of his own.  This procession of names for what is 
intuitively, but not necessarily logically, a single entity constitutes a sort of intralingual 
translation.  As strange as translating proper names may seem, it is possible and does occur more 
often than typically recognized.  
To further complicate matters, proper names are infused with other elements of language 
such as symbolism and multiplicity that define them as other than perfectly true names.  Derrida 
elucidates this mixed nature of proper nouns in “Des Tours de Babel” in regard to what could be 
considered the icon of translation theory: the Tower of Babel.  As Derrida writes, the name 
Babel, which is today often considered a proper name, can be affixed to the name of the Biblical 
story which derives its name from the city or tower which in turn is derived from the Lord’s 
proclamation of a name, a proper name, which destroyed the tower, scattered the builders, and 
confused language on earth (Des Tours 171).  In this way, Babel, like most proper nouns, 
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represents both a human concept as well as multiple specific entities, thus it is not a pure proper 
noun in the sense discussed previously.  As Derrida writes, the Lord scattered and divided the 
language of the Semites by stating a proper name that signified both proper and improper 
entities; he infused the title of a single entity with less than proper meaning.  We can see then 
that so-called proper names necessitate translation as much as any other term for a number of 
reasons. 
1.3 
The argument thus far shows that human concepts are constructs of language; it is no 
stretch then to see that the connection between those concepts and the words that represent them 
is equally arbitrary, equally a product of language.  Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure 
pioneered this idea in 1916 in his Course on General Linguistics, showing the utter randomness 
that pervades language.  He breaks down language into three fundamental components: the sign, 
signifier, and signified (de Saussure 964).  The signified is the entity or class of entities that is 
being named, while the signifier is the word or label that a language gives that concept.  The sign 
then is the combination of the two.  De Saussure notes that the signifier and signified are 
inextricably linked to those people entangled in a language.  He uses the analogy of a piece of 
paper, in which the signifier is one side, and the signified is the other.  One cannot separate the 
two sides, and any division of one half necessarily means a division on the other (de Saussure 
967).  So, the connection between the signified and the signifier is arbitrary, but also inseparable; 
the concept evokes the label, and the label evokes the concept. 
This inseparability can be attributed to and explained by the artificial nature of an entity, 
or a signified.  As we have already discussed, signifieds do not naturally exist in anything more 
than a purely ephemeral way, yet humans have managed to create coherent concepts out of all of 
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that chaos.  It is language itself that serves this indispensable purpose.  Words serve to order and 
limit the incomprehensible abundance of the universe into manageable entities; in other words, 
the systems of signifiers that are languages actively create the signifieds, bringing them into 
existence out of essentially nothing.   So it is clear that the signified cannot exist without the 
signifier, and of course, the signifier cannot exist without the signified it creates without 
becoming meaningless.  I should make explicit at this point that, while I have thus far only used 
nouns as examples of signs, all classes of words are arbitrary signs.  Take verbs for example; a 
verb relays an action, and the lines that divide categories of action are as constructed as those 
that divide nouns.  To English speakers, it seems utterly natural to divide verbs according to a 
temporal relationship, past, present, future, etc.  While that characteristic may be common to 
many languages, it is not universal.  Hebrew does not conjugate verbs according to the action’s 
place in time, and Japanese does not conjugate verbs at all.  Other parts of speech may be more 
subtle in their nature as a signifier, but they are equally invented and arbitrary; think for example 
of the multitude of meanings for the preposition of: possession, the territory of the Mongols, 
constitution, the cloak of silk, origin, Lawrence of Arabia, etc. 
One can immediately recognize the import of the arbitrary nature of concepts and their 
connections with their labels to the practice of translation.  It means that perfect transfer of 
concepts between languages is impossible.  De Saussure gives many examples of this 
incompatibility in his Course in General Linguistics, one of which I will mention here.  In 
English, there are the two concepts of sheep and mutton, each with its own word or label; in 
French however, the word mouton can mean either what English speakers call sheep or mutton.  
As de Saussure writes, the words sheep and mouton have different values because English has 
that second word mutton, which limits the concept being expressed by its counterpart sheep (de 
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Saussure 969).  Clearly, the perfect transfer of meaning between English and French on this topic 
would be impossible because the linguistically defined concepts do not correspond between the 
languages.  One might argue that this example represents a relatively special case in which the 
concepts are not aligned, but that they usually do correspond.  Unfortunately for the translator, 
perfect or even adequate equivalence rarely if ever actually occurs, which helps to prevent 
perfect translation. 
1.4 
At this point, it should be clear that language is pervaded on multiple levels by the 
arbitrary human categorization of an inherently incomprehensible universe.  This arbitrariness 
permits the potential for every person to have a unique language; after all, we are not bound to 
construct language around any concepts external to human thought, and human thought is 
infinitely variable.  Because language essentially constructs and defines the way in which each 
person interacts with reality, language can be understood as not only a system for 
communication, but also as the perspective with which each person understands the world.  
Thought therefore occurs only in terms of and as a product of a person’s language. 
This concept of language informing thought is known as linguistic relativity and is not a 
new or radical idea.  It was first elucidated in the early 20
th
 century by linguists and 
anthropologists such as Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Lee Whorf.  In the one 
hundred years since its inception, this theory has experienced the expected variety of criticism 
and support, and it continues to receive support from the academic and scientific community to 
this day.  I bring up the history of the theory not to go into a lengthy discussion of its arguments, 
refutations, and counter-refutations, but to show that there has been a variety of scientific 
evidence supporting it.  It is not some wild philosophical concept that has little relevance or 
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connection to the real world.  I will give one example of such evidence, but there are many other 
studies that provide comparable support. 
It has been noted in the United States, often with sighs of resignation, that East Asian 
students tend to be much better at math than their Western counterparts.  As Malcolm Gladwell 
writes in his book Outliers: The Story of Success, “On international comparison tests, students 
from Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan all score roughly the same in 
math, around the ninety-eight percentile.  The United States, France, England, Germany, and 
other western industrialized nations cluster at somewhere between the twenty-six and thirty-six 
percentile” (Gladwell 231).   Gladwell attributes this discrepancy to the difference in the 
“number-naming systems in Western and Asian languages” (Gladwell 228).  Think about 
English numbers for instance; sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen all follow a pattern, but 
then eleven, twelve, and thirteen do not.  Beyond that, in the two-digit numbers twenty and 
above, English speakers construct the number by saying the tens digit first followed by the ones 
digit, but in the teens, the reverse is true.  The number system does not adequately follow logical 
patterns, so it is counterintuitive and linguistically “clumsy,” which means that it is more 
difficult for westerners to count, and by extension, to do math than it is for speakers of Asian 
languages (Gladwell 230).  If the simple convention of naming numbers affects mathematical 
thinking, more fundamental differences in language surely have widespread effects on thought.  
For more, and perhaps more generally applicable, examples of such effects, see Sapir’s work 
with Native American languages and their impacts on thought.   
Derrida discussed this concept of linguistic relativity in his work Monolingualism of the 
Other or The Prosthesis of Origin.  He proffers the following pair of seemingly paradoxical 
statements as an argument on the nature of language (Monolingualism 7). 
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1. We only ever speak one language. 
2. We never only speak one language. 
The meaning of the first statement is fairly clear, when one understands language to be a 
perspective; a person can only ever have one perspective on the world, and therefore only speaks 
one language in the sense that Derrida is using.  Derrida uses himself as an example in 
Monolingualism of the Other.  He speaks French, but was born and raised as a Jew in Algeria.  
The combination of those three disparate identities, French, Jewish, and Algerian all contribute 
to his perspective of the universe, but they do not allow him to have more than one perspective.  
He maintains just one perspective that is a result of the conglomeration of those three influences, 
and others as well.  We can apply this more specifically to languages as well; an American 
English speaking person could learn Mexican Spanish, for example.  At that point, we would 
consider that person bilingual, but according to Derrida’s view of language, that person still has 
only one language, or perspective, which is now a mix of American English, Mexican Spanish, 
and a vast number of other contributors. 
The second statement is a bit more problematic.  The ever-obfuscating Derrida seems to 
be making the point that people do not possess or otherwise control their language or perspective 
in any way.  We are essentially helpless because we cannot operate outside of the framework of 
our language.  This framework is the result of social and experiential factors rather than any sort 
of personal thought or intent.  To put rather crudely, we do not speak our one language, it speaks 
us.  One could make the counterargument that a person can select to some extent the experiences 
that befall them.  That is quite true, but the person cannot truly control the effect that those 
chosen experiences have on his or her perspective or identity.   
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This statement could also be interpreted another, more literal, way as saying that a person 
never speaks the standard that represents a language.  No one speaks pure French, for instance, 
despite the efforts of the French Academy of Language.  The previous paragraph discussed the 
multitude of elements that define and constitute a person’s language or perspective, and it is this 
multitude that precludes the possibility of speaking a pure language.  The labels and ideas behind 
terms such as French or Chinese are analogous to lines of latitude and longitude.  These lines do 
not represent any natural phenomenon, they are simply human superimpositions placed over the 
planet to allow people to locate their relative position.  Similarly, when a person is said to speak 
French, that term means not that they speak “pure” French, but they speak a language closer to 
“pure” French than to our concept of another language.  Language names are used to 
approximate one’s linguistic and therefore identificatory position, not to exactly pinpoint or 
define it. 
In the previous few paragraphs, I have made the claim that because thought occurs in 
terms of language, and language is largely dependent on infinitely varying experience and other 
factors of identity, human thought is infinitely variable.  Prominent linguist Noam Chomsky’s 
theory of universal grammar could conceivably derail this argument since it posits that all human 
languages share common fundamental characteristics.  Every language has the parts of speech 
that serve the functions of nouns and verbs, for instance.  A natural extension of this theory is 
that the human mind has a certain limited capacity to function differently in the realm of 
language, and by virtue of being limited, some components of language are shared by all people.  
The theory of universal grammar is by no means without criticism, but for the purposes of this 
thesis, I will not go into them because I have no need to attempt to refute this theory.  The idea 
that all languages share some fundamental characteristics seems to disprove the concept of 
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language as infinite that I have argued thus far.  However, the existence of shared characteristics 
does no such thing.  Even if every language is built upon the same foundations, they are free to 
develop from there according to an infinite number of variables.  Every language may have 
verbs, but their systems of conjugation, or lack thereof, could vary tremendously; every language 
might have nouns, but the categorizations defined by these terms could constrain reality in any 
number of ways.  Considering the number of potential avenues for languages to differ, some 
shared elements do not make them any less variable; subtracting from infinity still leaves 
infinity.  To use an analogy, a child could be first given a pot of blue finger-paint, but if she is 
then given thousands, or millions, of other colors to mix with the blue in various combinations, 
she will be able to make a functionally infinite number of colors.  Subtracting from the infinite 
variables of language still leaves an infinite number of ways in which languages can differ.  Even 
if Chomsky is correct in his theory of universal grammar, that does not take away the potential of 
language to be infinitely variable. 
1.5 
The point that the entire thesis thus far has been attempting to illustrate is the fairly 
mundane idea that language and perception are infinitely variable.  There is no comprehensible 
nature of the universe that guides and informs every person’s world.  People have that world 
defined for them according to an unlimited number of standards.  This vast pool of possible 
components of perception and identity means that every person experiences the universe 
uniquely.  The mothers who repeatedly told their toddlers that everyone is special were correct, 
in a roundabout way.  That idea is relevant to the practice of translation because it means that 
one cannot translate with the intention of mimicking the effect of a work on the original 
readership.  First, there is no original readership, just as there is no great blue heron; there is only 
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a scattering of unique and separate entities, that are each only a spectrum of unique and separate 
entities.   
One might proffer the counter-argument that, in this case, the defining characteristic of 
the so-called readership is that they are all English or French or Chinese speakers.  A translator 
might even narrow the focus of the original readership to something like intellectual, college 
educated, English speakers.  The readership may very well share this characteristic, but one 
cannot presume, given the infinite possibilities for perception, that the members of that 
readership reacted to the original text in a similar way.  To use an easy example, the child of a 
business tycoon who danced through college largely on his surname would likely react to a text 
differently than a poor man who paid his way through school with scholarships, even though 
they both fall within the translator’s criteria for the original readership.  It is presumptuous of a 
translator to assume that a text’s original readership reacted in a similar way just because they 
can be labeled under a few general categories; therefore, one cannot aim to produce a good 
translation by attempting to mimic its effect on a readership.  I should explicitly state at this point 
that, when I say a good translation, I mean a translation that as well as possible transfers into 
another language the properties of the original that have the potential to elicit or aid in eliciting a 
reaction.  That seems an appropriate definition since the entire purpose of translation is the 
transfer of such properties.  For the remainder of this thesis, I will refer to those properties as the 
text’s meaning. 
1.6 
I propose that the approach to translation which best permits the transfer of meaning is 
one which translates for the text as an entity, rather than for the imitation of an imagined 
readership reaction or for some real or presumed authorial intent.  As has been discussed at 
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length thus far, the reaction of the original readership cannot be replicated because identity and 
therefore perception are necessarily infinitely variable.  One could make the argument that, while 
a translator cannot predict the reaction of individual audience members on either side of the 
translation, he or she may in fact be able to approximate the perception of the readership as a 
whole.  Returning to the analogy of the lines of latitude and longitude, a translator could, 
according to this argument, produce a work in a language aimed at the equator or the Tropic of 
Cancer based on the presumed similarities between the people that share that location or identity.  
In other words, a translator of Cantonese into English, for example, could estimate the 
conglomerate nature of the Cantonese speaking population based on the intricacies of the 
Cantonese system of thought, gauge that conglomerate’s reaction to a text, and then attempt to 
mimic that reaction in the conglomerate of English speakers.  Indeed, much of the corpus of 
modern American translation seems to have been completed more or less according to this 
method. 
I would argue against this practice, however reasonable it may seem, because whatever 
limited similarities are shared by the multiplicities that are the collective speakers of a language 
are dwarfed by the differences.  As Derrida discussed at length in relation to his own identity as a 
Jewish, white, French-speaker born in Algeria, his perception of a text would be vastly different 
than a Parisian French-speaker’s, or that of a speaker born in French Vietnam, or French Guiana.  
This variety of intralingual identity is not only the case with the languages of various parts of 
imperialist nations, such as France.  If one were to walk the length of America’s east coast, or 
west coast for that matter, he or she would find cultural and individual identities that are more 
similar to those of other languages than to those of their own countrymen.  For example, an 
English-speaking lawyer living in Long Island, New York, would likely have an identity more 
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akin to a French-speaking lawyer in the suburbs of Paris than to an English-speaking 
methamphetamine cook in the Appalachians.  Variables such as profession, income, and religion 
all contribute to identity like language, so making assumptions about identity and perception 
based solely on language is as meaningless as doing so based on race, which is obviously 
frowned upon in modern America.  Yet somehow, these reductive practices have become the 
relatively unquestioned norm in American publishing. 
The third possible approach to translation, the first two being for the readership and for 
the text itself, is to focus on authorial intent.  However, this strategy is as nonsensical as 
translating to mimic a reaction.  For one thing, the author is only involved in the early stages of a 
work; once it has been published, it is, with a few exceptions, out of his or her hands entirely.  
Once this separation has been achieved, no author can predict the future significance of the 
piece.  Take for example the film The Birth of a Nation.  It was intended by the filmmakers to be 
seen as a tale of heroes defending their people and homeland from evil, but now it is just 
considered by most people to be racist propaganda, which attempts to make the Ku Klux Klan 
seem like the triumphant champions of the noble Southern way of life.  If one attempted to 
translate according to authorial intent the entire modern meaning of the piece would be lost, and 
the translation would be scorned according to modern moral norms.  An author is an irrelevant 
figure in the practice of translation because it is the text that is in question, not one person’s view 
of that text, no matter how integral to the text that person may have once been. 
Instead of using such rash generalizations or presumptions as the basis for translation, 
one should use the text as an entity in and of itself as the foundation.  A text, like any other 
entity, can be seen as a spectrum.  It began its existence in the mind of the author, was written, 
edited, and then published, all the while undergoing changes to its nature, just like a blue heron 
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as it ages.  However, once the work has been published, its changes become limited to superficial 
physical modifications.  Of course, there could be subsequent editions of the book, which would 
contain a variety of changes; however, each copy of a book from each publication is essentially 
an individual entity.  It will eventually be destroyed like all entities as the paper and binding 
wear and disintegrate, but until that time the text will remain fixed, possessing a set of 
characteristics that can elicit a reaction from a reader. 
The common argument against the idea of a text as its own entity revolves around the 
concept of a changing and necessary readership.  The thought is that without an audience or the 
possibility of an audience, a work would merely be ink on paper in a strange pattern.  It is the 
audience that adds the layer of significance and meaning to that otherwise purely physical entity, 
and because the audience is ever changing, the significance of the text is ever changing.  This 
argument is similar to the old cliché “does a tree falling in the woods make a noise if there is no 
one there to hear it?”  While we cannot say for certain that the existence of sound does not 
require the presence of an ear, there is no causal linkage between the ear and the noise that a tree 
makes as it falls, so it is valid to assume that a sound is indeed produced despite the absence of 
an attentive readership.  Benjamin comments on this problem writing, 
One might, for example, speak of an unforgettable life or moment even if all men had 
forgotten it.  If the nature of such a life or moment required that it be unforgotten, that 
predicate would not imply a falsehood but merely a claim unfulfilled by men, and 
probably a reference to a realm in which it is fulfilled: God’s remembrance (Benjamin 
76).   
 
“God’s remembrance” can be understood figuratively to mean the state in which everything is 
understood.  It is equally valid to assume that the text exists as more than just a physical entity.  
A work is like a wall in an elementary school playground; during recess kids come and throw 
balls against the wall, and the wall bounces them back to the kids.  The wall may be fluid, but 
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balls are bounced back to the kids differently primarily depending on the nature of the kids who 
threw them.  A text, like the wall, has certain properties inherent to it which dictate the way that 
it can be received by a reader, and those properties never change.  If the kids throwing the balls 
all disappeared, if mankind went extinct, the nature of the text would not change; it would not 
lose the properties that allowed it to bounce balls.  Unfortunately, the reason that the question 
about the falling tree is a famous cliché is that, while the answer seems obvious intuitively, it 
cannot definitively be proven true.  One could certainly argue that a text only exists as we know 
it because people exist, and they could be proven neither right nor wrong. 
So, thus far we have covered three possible approaches to translation which can be 
described as for the audience, for the author, and for the text.  I should note at this point that I 
have assumed that the intent of the translator is to, as best as possible, facilitate the transfer of the 
original meaning of a work to a readership of a different language.  Those three approaches listed 
above correspond to three opinions regarding the source of meaning in a work: essentially 
whether it is the author, the audience, or the text itself that contains the text’s significance.  
However, if one’s goal is not to best transfer the original meaning, then there are many other 
approaches to translation as well.  I will devote no more time beyond this section to analyzing 
these methods because they lead to perversions rather than translations of the originals.  A 
“translator” could, for example, “translate” a piece to serve some kind of political or personal 
agenda, subtly or not so subtly twisting the original to serve some agenda that is not native to the 
piece.  The Diary of Anne Frank, for instance, was translated from Dutch into German by one 
particular translator in a way that “[toned] down all instances of descriptions of Germans…that 
could be construed as insulting.  As a result, the plight of Jews in the Netherlands is, 
correspondingly, made to appear less harsh than it actually was” (Lefevere 66).  While this may 
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be one of the more heavy-handed instances of such modification in place of true translation, 
smaller, but equally inappropriate, injustices often occur.  Again, these sorts of approaches 
produce bastardizations rather than translations, and will therefore be discussed no further here.  
I will assume, perhaps naively, that translators have in mind the best interests of preserving a 
work’s meaning. 
Returning to the three conceivably correct approaches outlined and argued above, we 
have yet to reach a final, definite conclusion about which is best for achieving the 
aforementioned goal.  Translating for the audience has been the focus of much of this thesis thus 
far, and it should be clear at this point that it is a ludicrous and borderline offensive tactic.  It 
reduces the individuals within both the original and target readership to one dimension of their 
identity, one dimension which, although shared with the other members of that language, could 
comprise only a small portion of the factors that determine perception, and therefore reception, 
of a work.  Translating for the audience is definitely not the way.  The second option, translating 
for the author, is just as misguided.  The author is just another person who has a perception of the 
piece, and that perception may be, not wrong, but foolish by most standards.  Consider the 
theoretical example of an author writing a simple murder mystery about a child who kills his 
parents.  Upon publication, readers might understand the plot to be representative of the author’s 
repressed anger at his own parents.  A translator who is only considering authorial intent might 
produce a work that contains none of those triggers that caused the audience to reach such a 
conclusion.  This would therefore be a poor translation, not because it superficially did not 
replicate an audience reaction, but because it did not contain the elements necessary to produce 
that reaction.  It changed the properties of the wall such that it could no longer bounce balls in a 
particular way; the inherent properties of the text were changed.  An author is typically just as 
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ignorant of the full significance of his or her work as anyone else, so translating according to that 
limited perspective is a flawed approach. 
Which brings us to the final possible tactic for translation: translating for the text itself.  
As already discussed, the question of whether or not the meaning of a work persists without a 
potential audience is unanswerable.  We can, however, assume that, because the nature of the 
text as an entity does not change with the impossibility of reception, a work does exist in its own 
right.  This assumption is not unimpeachable, so this tactic does not transcend all doubt, but 
translation by its nature is not a pursuit that ever involves certainty or decisions that are beyond 
reproach.  Translators are always faced with the dilemma of choosing the best option out of a 
collection of imperfect choices.  Translating for the text itself is the best of these options 
because, unlike the other possibilities, it is not theoretically indefensible.  Translating for the 
readership or for the author’s intent simply cannot work.  One could argue that a text does not 
have an independent existence, but even translating for an imagined construct of that entity 
permits better results.  There is a text that is being translated, a physical, albeit fluid, chain of 
meaningful symbols, and that is enough for a translator to begin to approximate this entity that 
may or may not exist.  An absolute adherence to the words in a text, to the entity of a text, 
maximizes the likelihood of preserving the characteristics of a work that elicit its varied 
receptions, therefore translating for the text itself is the best approach to translation. 
It may seem strange that I am forwarding the notion of the text as an independent entity 
because this thesis is based on the idea that entities are the unreliable and arbitrary products of 
language as a system of perception.  The signifiers on a page have no inherent characteristic that 
separates them from, say, a rock or a Great Blue Heron; they are as artificial an entity as any 
other.  I would argue that basing a translation on an entity that does not exist as we know it, is 
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still better than basing it on some illusionary perception of an imagined readership or author.  
Even if the author is alive to give his or her input, he or she still has only their own inaccurate 
opinion of what the text is.  In other words, the text is an arbitrary human construct, but the 
author’s opinion is a skewed perspective on that construct, and the translator’s opinion on the 
author’s opinion or audience’s reaction is a skewed perspective on a skewed perspective.  There 
are fewer divides between actuality and the translation when translating for the text rather than 
for the author or for the audience.   
The idea of a text as its own entity may, for those familiar with translation theory, seem 
to echo Walter Benjamin’s writings on what he calls sacred texts.  His ideas, however, focus on 
religious texts, primarily the Bible, which can be considered sacred in the more traditional sense 
of the word.  He writes “It is vouchsafed to Holy Writ alone, in which meaning has ceased to be 
the watershed for the flow of language and the flow of revelation.  Where a text is identical with 
truth or dogma, where it is supposed to be ‘the true language’ in all its literalness” (Benjamin 
83).  To sum up his arguments, texts like the Bible are an embodiment of unimpeachable Truth, 
since they are the divine word, the word of God.  They cannot be modified or reinvented without 
loss of meaning because they contain Truth in every word and phrase.  I extend this attribute of 
Truth to every work, not just religious texts.  Every text is not imbued with Truth by God, as 
Benjamin argues is the case for the Bible; they embody a Truth solely by virtue of being a 
snapshot of a specific perspective at a specific point in time.  They contain a human Truth, which 
is just as easily lost to careless modification and translation.  Every work should be treated as 
sacred, because the human Truths within it is well worth discovering, and can be outright 
destroyed by poor translation practices. 
1.7 
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Accepting this approach as best, the important question then becomes: how does one best 
translate for the text, or how does one best reconstruct in another language the precise edifice 
that is the original work.  The answer lies in what is known as “foreignization” among translation 
theorists.  Lawrence Venuti, expanding upon the ideas of the German philosopher Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, wrote that there are two types of translation: foreignizing and domesticating.  
Schleiermacher writes, “Either the translator leaves the author in peace as much as possible and 
moves the reader toward him [foreignization]; or he leaves the reader in peace as much as 
possible and moves the writer toward him [domestication]” (Schleiermacher 49).  Practically 
speaking, a domestication involves sacrificing various details of the original in the hopes of 
producing a work that seems as though it was written in the target language from the beginning; 
it essentially values fluency in the target language above fidelity to the original text. 
Foreignization, on the other hand, sacrifices this fluency or naturalness in the target 
language in favor of a closer adherence to the original.  These types of translations can be 
awkward or seemingly ungrammatical in the target language.  In an excellent translation of Jorge 
Luis Borges’s works, which I will discuss at length later, the translator often combined the 
subject pronoun and the verb into one word because, in Spanish, the subject pronoun is often 
omitted since it is implied in the conjugation of the verb (Hurley 49).  This translation reflects 
that nuance of meaning as best as it can, but in doing so constructs words and sentences that are 
technically incorrect in English.  I advocate a particularly extreme version of this sort of 
foreignization. 
I have been arguing thus far that one should translate to reproduce as closely as possible 
the productive characteristics of a text.  These characteristics are contained in every minute 
element of that work.  Every word, every syntactical detail, and even, for lack of a better term, 
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the music or sound of a text affects the overall significance.  The meaning of Ernest 
Hemingway’s novels would undoubtedly be different without their barren, simplistic prose, and 
on the other extreme, it would be difficult to imagine the significance of James Joyce’s works 
without their convoluted, stream of consciousness writing style.  Consider again de Saussure’s 
example of “mutton” and “mouton.”  Each word has a different value or significance which 
could sway the implication of a phrase in a particular direction.  A word that contains the 
meaning of both “sheep” and “mutton” would elicit a different response than a word that 
contains only the meaning of “mutton.”  Every tiny detail is an irreplaceable part of the text as an 
entity. 
The vital nature of this minutia means that to best reproduce the exact meaning of the 
original, a translator must replicate every detail, which entails extreme foreignization.  Each 
word must be considered in regard to its meaning, sound, and context, among other factors, and 
be replaced with another word in the target language that best approximates these attributes.  
Languages are not even remotely corresponding systems of communication, so not only is this 
(and every other) approach to translation doomed to failure, but it will create translations that are 
exceptionally difficult to comprehend in the target language.  Picture a sentence in which every 
word contains some trickery such as combining the subject pronoun and the verb into one word.  
These works would be in no way light reading.  This is a regrettable consequence; however, it is 
the task of the translator to convey the meaning of an original work into another language, not to 
provide easy reading to his or her target readership.  It is not the translator’s responsibility to 
cater to the ignorance, and often laziness, of the readership at the expense of adequately 
representing the meaning of the original.  A “translator” who writes for a purpose such as 
producing a commercially or culturally viable piece (any purpose other than the effective 
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transmittance of the original meaning) produces not translations but bastardizations.  Extreme 
foreignization is the method that best achieves what is actually meant by translation and intended 
by capable translators. 
1.8 
Permit me a few final comments before moving on from the theoretical portion of this 
thesis to practical examples of good and bad translations.  I asserted earlier that foreignizing 
translations are doomed to failure, and that is absolutely the case.  It is impossible even to 
adequately transfer the productive characteristics of a work into another language.  This 
inevitable failure does not mean that the pursuit is not necessary or noble, and certainly does not 
mean that it is permissible for a translator to forsake this approach for a lesser vehicle.  The fact 
that good bastardization is possible to accomplish, for it is clearly possible to produce a 
commercially successful and popularly acclaimed translation, does not legitimize it in any way.  
One should struggle with foreignization despite its futility because it will better convey meaning, 
even if it does not adequately convey meaning. 
Finally, the demands and rigors of foreignization mean that certain works are 
untranslatable.  Theoretically, all works are untranslatable, but even practically there will be 
some texts that simply cannot be transferred at all.  These will typically be composed so 
completely or integrally of culturally specific elements that they could not be understood by a 
foreign readership.  Culturally specific works of humor are a perfect example of this sort of 
work.  Take a colloquial essay satirizing the history of Russia, for instance.  It could contain such 
a variety of idiomatic expressions and obscure historical references that the translator would 
have to include a section of explanatory endnotes that would exceed the essay in length.  This 
could be done of course, but the humor of the piece would be lost within a maze of explanations.  
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Such a translation would utterly fail to transmit the essay’s significance despite perfectly done 
foreignization; a joke is rarely funny if it has to be explained.  These kinds of pieces should not 
be translated at all, because such an endeavor would be useless. 
Part 2: Examples 
In the following section, I will analyze and compare foreignizing and domesticating 
translation choices in the works of professional translators, as well as one selection of my own.  I 
would emphasize that these examples do not necessarily represent “good” or “bad” translations, 
and certainly do not necessarily contain the “correct” choices that one should make in translating 
a particular text.  While I believe that foreignizing translations tend to be “better” (more 
reflective of the original) than their domesticating counterparts, I intend to simply put forward 
examples of both philosophies, without placing any judgment on their relative merit.  Finally, it 
is important to note also that foreignizing and domesticating are relative terms, existing only in 
conjunction with one another, so each choice that I claim to be foreignizing or domesticating is 
only so compared to other translations.   
The following selections are two translations of the short story “Las Ruinas Circulares,” 
written originally in Spanish by Jorge Luis Borges.  The first translation was completed by 
Andrew Hurley, and the second by Norman Thomas di Giovanni. 
Lo soñó activo, caluroso, secreto, del grandor de un puño cerrado, color granate en la 
penumbra de un cuerpo humano aun sin cara ni sexo; con minucioso amor lo soñó, 
durante catorce lúcidas noches. Cada noche, lo percibía con mayor evidencia. No lo 
tocaba: se limitaba a atestiguarlo, a observarlo, tal vez a corregirlo con la mirada. Lo 
percibía, lo vivía, desde muchas distancias y muchos ángulos. La noche catorcena rozó la 
arteria pulmonar con el índice y luego todo el corazón, desde afuera y adentro. El examen 
lo satisfizo. Deliberadamente no soñó durante una noche: luego retomó el corazón, 
invocó el nombre de un planeta y emprendió la visión de otro de los órganos principales. 
Antes de un año llegó al esqueleto, a los párpados. El pelo innumerable fue tal vez la 
tarea más difícil. Soñó un hombre íntegro, un mancebo, pero éste no se incorporaba ni 




He dreamed the heart warm, active, secret—about the size of a closed fist, a garnet-
colored thing inside the dimness of a human body that was still faceless and sexless; he 
dreamed it, with painstaking love, for fourteen brilliant nights. Each night he perceived it 
with greater clarity, greater certainty. He did not touch it; he only witnessed it, observed 
it, corrected it, perhaps, with his eyes. He perceived it, helived it, from many angles, 
many distances. On the fourteenth night, he stroked the pulmonary artery with his 
forefinger, and then the entire heart, inside and out. And his inspection made him proud. 
He deliberately did not sleep the next night; then he took up the heart again, invoked the 
name of a planet, and set about dreaming another of the major organs. Before the year 
was out he had reached the skeleton, the eyelids.  The countless hairs of the body were 
perhaps the most difficult task. The man had dreamed a fully fleshed man—a stripling—
but this youth did not stand up or speak, nor could it open its eyes. Night after night, the 
man dreamed the youth asleep (Hurley 49). 
 
He dreamed it throbbing, warm, secret.  It was the size of a closed fist, a darkish red in 
the dimness of a human body still without a face or sex.  With anxious love he dreamed it 
for fourteen lucid nights.  Each night he perceived it more clearly.  He did not touch it, 
but limited himself to witnessing it, to observing it, to correcting it now and then with a 
look.  He felt it, he lived it from different distances and from many angles.  On the 
fourteenth night he touched the pulmonary artery with a finger and then the whole heart, 
inside and out.  The examination satisfied him.  For one night he deliberately did not 
dream; after that he went back to the heart again, invoked the name of a planet, and set 
out to envision another of the principal organs.  Before a year was over he came to the 
skeleton, the eyelids.  The countless strands of hair were perhaps the hardest task of all.  
He dreamed a whole man, a young man, but the young man could not stand up or speak, 
nor could he open his eyes.  Night after night, the man dreamed him asleep (di Giovanni 
58). 
 
The variety of foreignizing and domesticating choices available in a single sentence is 
evident in the opening line of this passage.  The phrase Lo soñó activo, literally means It he 
dreamed active.  Both Hurley and di Giovanni rearranged the word order to conform with the 
English syntactical convention that the subject and verb should precede the object.  In English, 
the word order of the literal translation does make sense, although not at first glance, but both 
translators modified it to be more accessible to their target readership.  Furthermore, Hurley 
replaces the direct object pronoun with the noun to which it refers (the heart), likely for the sake 
of clarity, and then rearranges the order of the subsequent string of adjectives, putting warm 
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before active/throbbing.  Di Giovanni, on the other hand, maintains the direct object pronoun as 
well as the word order of the adjectives, making his choices in this portion more foreignizing 
than those of Hurley.  However, after preserving much of the original in this part of the sentence, 
he radically alters the structure of the rest of it.  In the Spanish, the sentence continues beyond 
this point, as one can see above, but di Giovanni chooses to divide the line into two sentences, 
ending the first after the string of adjectives.  Hurley also modifies the structure of the sentence 
somewhat, replacing the comma linking secreto and del grandor de un puño cerrado with a 
dash.  Both versions domesticate the syntax of the original, but Hurley does so less dramatically 
than di Giovanni. So in just one line, Hurley opts for more domesticating diction and word order, 
and generally more foreignizing syntax than di Giovanni. 
Further into the passage, there is an example of combining the subject pronoun and the 
conjugated verb into one word that I mentioned in passing earlier in this thesis.  The word 
helived, in the fifth line of Hurley’s translation, is a great instance of a dramatically foreignizing 
choice.  I will not repeat the comparative intricacies of the Spanish and English languages at 
length, but in sum, a verb’s subject pronoun in Spanish is often omitted because it is implied, to 
some extent, by the conjugation of the verb, and further by textual context.  In this particular 
case, the original verb vivía is the past imperfect conjugation of the English verb to live in the 
form for which he, she, or it is the subject, here the unspecified subject.  By combining the 
subject, identified through contextual clues, with the verb in English, Hurley communicates the 
linguistic difference between the two languages, without sacrificing intelligibility.  This is an 
excellent foreignizing decision, and one which should be more widely practiced by translators of 
Spanish into English. 
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Instances of Hurley’s more domesticating choices can be seen in the previous two lines, 
which are reproduced below with the Spanish original. 
Cada noche, lo percibía con mayor evidencia. No lo tocaba: se limitaba a atestiguarlo, a 
observarlo, tal vez a corregirlo con la mirada. 
 
Each night he perceived it with greater clarity, greater certainty. He did not touch it; he 
only witnessed it, observed it, corrected it, perhaps, with his eyes. 
 
Each night he perceived it more clearly.  He did not touch it, but limited himself to 
witnessing it, to observing it, to correcting it now and then with a look.   
 
The Spanish can be translated literally to mean: 
Each/Every night, it he perceived/sensed with higher/utmost 
evidence/cogency/palpability.  It he did not touch/feel/handle: himself he 
limited/restricted to witnessing/attesting it, to observing/watching it, 
perhaps/maybe/perchance to correcting/righting/amending it with the look/gaze/glance. 
 
One can see that, in the first sentence, Hurley was both more domesticating and more 
foreignizing than di Giovanni.  Hurley retained the prepositional phrase structure of con mayor 
evidencia/with greater clarity, while di Giovanni changed the syntax into an adverbial phrase, 
more clearly, directly modifying the verb.  However, Hurley follows this relatively foreignizing 
decision with the addition of the phrase greater certainty, which is not present in the original at 
all.  Perhaps, Hurley thought that phrase was communicated in the intricacies of the one modifier 
in the Spanish, but found no single English phrase that could encompass this full meaning.  
However, this nuance is not inherent to the Spanish word itself without contextual clues, so 
Hurley was taking significant license with the original in adding it.  In the following sentence, he 
modifies the syntax even further, changing the list of gerund direct objects to a list of conjugated 
verbs.  Himself he limited/restricted to observing/watching it, perhaps/maybe/perchance to 
correcting/righting/amending it becomes he only witnessed it, observed it, corrected it, perhaps.  
Di Giovanni’s translation more accurately reflects this syntactical detail, writing but limited 
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himself to witnessing it, to observing it, to correcting it now and then with a look, although he 
does change the two independent clauses linked with a colon into one independent clause and 
one dependent clause connected by a comma and a conjunction.  Clearly, neither translator 
perfectly preserved the syntax and grammatical structures of the original Spanish, but di 
Giovanni’s choices tend to be more faithful to the original than Hurley’s, at least in maintaining 
sentence structure. 
Below are two translations and the original text of the Julio Cortázar short story Axolotl, 
originally written and published in Spanish in “Final del Juego.”  The first translation was 
produced by American poet and translator Paul Blackburn, and the second is my own. 
Les temía. Creo que de no haber sentido la proximidad de otros visitantes y del guardián, 
no me hubiese atrevido a quedarme solo con ellos. «Usted se los come con los ojos», me 
decía riendo el guardián, que debía suponerme un poco desequilibrado. No se daba 
cuenta de que eran ellos los que me devoraban lentamente por los ojos en un canibalismo 
de oro. Lejos del acuario no hacía mas que pensar en ellos, era como si me influyeran a 
distancia. Llegué a ir todos los días, y de noche los imaginaba inmóviles en la oscuridad, 
adelantando lentamente una mano que de pronto encontraba la de otro. Acaso sus ojos 
veían en plena noche, y el día continuaba para ellos indefinidamente. Los ojos de los 
axolotl no tienen párpados (Cortázar 144). 
 
I was afraid of them.  I think that had it not been for feeling the proximity of other 
visitors and the guard, I would not have been bold enough to remain alone with them.  
“You eat them alive with your eyes, hey,” the guard said, laughing; he likely thought I 
was a little cracked.  What he didn’t notice was that it was they devouring me slowly with 
their eyes, in a cannibalism of gold.  At any distance from the aquarium, I had only to 
think of them, it was as though I were being affected from a distance.  It got to the point 
that I was going every day, and at night I thought of them immobile in the darkness, 
slowly putting a hand out which immediately encountered another.  Perhaps their eyes 
could see in the dead of night, and for them the day continued indefinitely.  The eyes of 
axolotls have no lids. (Blackburn 7). 
 
I feared them.  I believe that without feeling the proximity of other visitors and of the 
guard, I would not have dared to remain alone with them.  <You eat them with your 
eyes>, said to me laughing the guard, that he must have supposed me a little unbalanced.  
I did not give him the story that it was they that devour me slowly with their eyes in a 
cannibalism of gold.  Far from the aquarium it was not much to think on them, it was as if 
they influenced me at a distance.  I came to go every day, and at night I imagined them 
unmoving in the darkness, advancing slowly one hand which soon found that of the other.  
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Perhaps their eyes saw in full night, and the day continued for them indefinitely.  The 
eyes of the axolotl don’t have eyelids. 
 
Even at first glance, my translation reads less fluently in English than Blackburn’s.  It contains 
phrases such as “I came to go” and “that he expected me a bit unbalanced,” which are choppy 
and much less logical in English than their alternatives “It got to the point that I was going” and 
“he likely thought I was a little cracked” (Blackburn 7).   See the comparisons with the Spanish 
below: 
 Llegué a ir 
 It got to the point that I was going 
 I came to go 
The verb llegar in Spanish means to arrive/to reach/to come, and in the case above is conjugated 
in the first person preterit tense (non-habitual past action), and the phrase a ir means literally to 
go.  Clearly, my translation mirrors more closely the Spanish and does make sense in English; 
however, the significance of the expression is more easily accessible to English readers in the 
form translated by Blackburn.  It does not require a second thought to comprehend the 
significance of the phrase in that first version, as it does in the second. 
 The second phrase in question is reproduced below. 
 que debía suponerme un poco desequilibrado 
 he likely thought I was a little cracked 
 that he must have supposed me a little unbalanced 
In Spanish, que is a common conjunction, typically meaning that; deber is a verb meaning 
should/ought/must, and in this case, is conjugated in the third person habitual past tense.  
Suponerme is the combination of the infinitive suponer, meaning to suppose/to presuppose, and 
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the direct object me, corresponding to me in English.  Finally, the words un poco desequilibrado, 
mean a little/short/lesser unbalanced/lopsided, respectively. 
Again, my own translation is much more literal, and more difficult to follow, than 
Blackburn’s.  He removes the transition word que, which is needless and obfuscating in English, 
and simplifies the combination of a verb and an infinitive into just a verb, imparting the 
uncertainty of the word debía with likely rather than the more literal must have.  Then, in the case 
of the final word, desequilibrado, Blackburn uses an English colloquialism, cracked, which is a 
mark of a domesticating translation, since it changes the text not only into English words, but 
also into an English context, or system of expression.  He also changes the structure of the 
sentence, turning one independent clause with a direct object into a dependent clause couched in 
an independent clause.  See below: 
 
{he likely thought [I was a little cracked]} 
  {that he must have supposed me a little unbalanced} 
 
 
All of these changes to the diction and syntax of the original Spanish show Blackburn’s 
translation to be domesticating, at least in comparison to my own.  Undoubtedly, most readers 
would prefer Blackburn’s piece, since it does not fly in the face of the conventions of the English 
language, but it does not as faithfully reproduce the original. 
There are a number of ways in which my apparently foreignizing translation does not 
conform to the original as thoroughly as possible.  You will note, for example, that I did not 





Beyond that, the conjugated verb debía can actually mean he/she/it/I must/should have in 
Spanish.  The subject is only understood through context.  You might notice that debía was 
translated with two words into English, which would seem to be a deviation from a totally 
faithful reproduction.  This is because the verbs must and ought do not have a past tense 
conjugation that is a single word.  Perhaps a more foreignizing decision would have been to 
translate it as musthave or perhaps must’ve, although that second option would enter into the 
realm of English colloquialism which foreignizing translators should avoid.  One should glean 
from this last discussion that there is not one perfect foreignizing translation of a text.  This form 
of translation is not some kind of simple word replacement that a computer could perform.  In 
any given phrase, there could be a number of foreignizing options, and it is the task of the 
translator to select one that he or she believes best walks the line between faith to the original 
and being minimally logical in English.  Again, I want to emphasize that the definitions of 
foreignization and domestication are quite fluid.  I found Blackburn’s translation above to be 
more foreignizing than many other translations that have been published, such as Ezra Pound’s 
translation of Chinese poetry (see below).  My own work is more foreignizing than his, and yet it 
does not contain a number of foreignizing choices that Andrew Hurley made in his translation of 
Borges.  Foreignization and domestication can really only be determined by analyzing the ways 
in which specific choices within a translation relate to corresponding choices in another 
translation. 
Up to this point, I have focused on translation practices as they apply to translation 
between two distinct languages.  However, there is another common form of translation: namely, 
when one translates intralingually across time in a single language.  The English language is rife 
with such works; high school students, for instance, often read versions of Shakespeare’s plays in 
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which the original language is juxtaposed with a modernized translation on the opposite page.  
Perhaps a less extreme version of such temporal translation occurs in the eighth edition of the 
Norton Anthology of English Literature’s treatment of Geoffrey Chaucer’s The Canterbury 
Tales.  I find their approach refreshingly foreignizing, although they can afford to be so because 
of the relatively small language gap between modern and Middle English.  A section from the 
general prologue of that classic text is reproduced below, with the formatting of Norton’s version 
preserved as best as possible (Chaucer 221). 
A Yeman hadde he
8
 and servants namo°     no more 
At that time, for him liste
9
 ride so;          
And he
1
 was clad in cote and hood of greene. 
A sheef of pecok arwes,° bright and keene,    arrows 
Under his belt he bar° ful thriftily; °     bore/properly 
Wel coude he dresse° his takel° yemanly:
2
    tend to/gear 
His arwes drouped nought with fetheres lowe. 
And in his hand he bar a mighty bowe. 
A not-heed° hadde he with a brown visage    close-cut head 
Of woodcraft wel coude° he al the usage    knew 
Upon his arm he bar a gay bracer,
3
 
And by his side a swerd° and a bokeler,
4
    sword 
And on that other side a gay daggere, 
Harneised° wel and sharp as point of spere;    mounted 
A Cristophre
5
 on his brest of silver sheene; °    bright 
An horn he bar, the baudrik
6
 was of greene. 
A forster was he smoothly,° as I gesse    forester/truly 
 
8. I.e., the Knight.  The “Yeman” 
(Yeoman) is an independent 
commoner who acts as the Knight’s 
military servant. 
9. It pleased him to. 
1. I.e. the Yeoman. 
2. In a workmanlike way. 
3. Wrist guard for archers. 
4. Buckler (a small shield). 
5. St. Christopher medal. 
6. Baldric (a supporting strap)
 
As I have already said, I think that this style of translation is admirable, although not 
generally applicable.  It is obviously foreignizing, since it produces the original text without 
integral modification, but the occasional translated word provided to the right of the text allows it 
Brewer 41 
to be considered within the realm of translation.  The practical problem inherent to this type of 
annotated translation is that most languages, past or present, are not similar enough to allow for 
simple annotation of the original text, without complete translation throughout.  Beowulf, for 
example, is an Old English work which must be translated in its entirety to be understood by 
modern English readers.   I include The Canterbury Tales in this thesis less as an example of 
what translation should or should not be, and more as an example of what American English 
readerships, at least fairly academic ones, are willing to wade through in reading a work. 
Lawrence Venuti, in his book The Translator’s Invisibility, samples a variety of 
professional reviews of translated works in order to get a sense of the general receptions that 
greet various approaches to translation in the United States.  He concludes from these examples 
that “fluency” in English is the primary standard against which translations are judged.  As 
Venuti writes, 
A fluent translation is written in English that is current (‘modern’) instead of archaic, that 
is widely used instead of specialized (‘jargonisation’), and that is standard instead of 
colloquial (‘slangy’).  Foreign words (‘pidgin’) are avoided, as are Britishisms in 
American translations and Americanisms in British translations.  Fluency also depends on 
syntax that is not so ‘faithful’ to the foreign text as to be ‘not quite idiomatic,’ that 
unfolds continuously and easily (not ‘doughy’) to insure semantic ‘precision’ with some 
rhythmic definition, a sense of closure (not a ‘dull thud’) (Venuti 5). 
 
Essentially, audiences want the foreign to be removed from a text and replaced with the 
domestic.  However, this expectation is not levied against The Canterbury Tales, which appears 
in a respected anthology full of archaic terms and colloquialisms and sentence structures that are 
idiomatic to Middle English.  American publishers and audiences are willing to accept all of 
these elements in a work that walks the line between being a translation and an unmodified text, 
but they are not willing to accept them in a full translation of a foreign language.  Could the 
difference be that these readers are more open to the foreign when it comes in the form of an 
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ancestor of their own language rather than an entirely different culture and language?  I have no 
means with which I could begin to answer this question, so I must limit myself to simply raising 
it.  However, the acceptance of the foreign in one medium and the rejection of it in another 
slightly, and only arguably, different one certainly does merit consideration. 
While most of the translations previously discussed may seem fairly domesticated, there 
are works that eclipse them in regard to liberty taken with the originals.  One of the most famous 
examples is the translations of Chinese poetry completed by Ezra Pound in the early 20
th
 century.  
Pound spoke no Chinese at the time he completed these translations, so one can imagine that a 
precise adherence to the original would have been impossible.  He was able to gain some insight 
into these works primarily through the notes of the then deceased Japanese art historian Ernest 
Fenollosa.  Yet despite lacking any immediate access to the original poems, Pound was confident 
in his work, calling his poems in Cathay “unquestionable,” for example (Cathay 32).  This 
example strikes me as a particularly unique case because Pound was both unable to read Chinese 
and was a poetic genius in his own right.  Many translations have been completed by established 
artists with a corpus of original work to their names; Paul Blackburn, the translator of the 
Cortázar piece above, was such a figure.  However, these artists were typically fluent in the 
original language.  The fact that Pound was not means that he was largely producing his own 
original work out of the scraps of knowledge he could glean about the Chinese.  He was creating 
his own original work rather than modifying the work of another for a new readership.  It is 
therefore a complete misnomer to call these poems translations; they are originals inspired by the 
works of others.   
Thus, Ezra Pound’s translations of Chinese poetry would be more appropriately labeled 
as “based on” the original poems, rather than as translations of them.  There is a precedent for 
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this sort of nomenclature in the realm of translation, and that occurs within what theorist Roman 
Jakobson calls intersemiotic translation.  Jakobson, in his article “On Linguistic Aspects of 
Translation,” writes that there are three categories of translation: intralingual, interlingual, and 
intersemiotic.  These categories are discrete types of translation, and the approaches discussed 
above can be applied to each one.  The terms are somewhat self-explanatory: 
 
1. Intralingual translation or rewording is an interpretation of verbal signs by means 
of other signs in the same language.   
2. Interlingual translation or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal signs by 
means of some other language. 
3. Intersemiotic translation or transmutation is an interpretation of verbal signs by 
means of signs of nonverbal sign systems (Jakobson 145). 
 
While the concept of intersemiotic translation may seem strange at first glance, it is a 
commonplace practice.  Perhaps the most omnipresent type of intersemiotic translation, in the 
United States at least, is the adaptation of novels, comics, video games, etc. into films.  It seems 
that every classic or bestselling book has a movie version these days; for instance, there have 
been nine screen adaptations of Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, including three television 
series, as well as a movie currently in development called Pride and Prejudice and Zombies, 
based on a recent novel of the same name (Results). 
Few people would consider these versions to be translations of the originals, but they do 
fall into Jakobson’s category of intersemiotic translation in that they transfer the story (or some 
other aspect) of the original into another medium.  I have yet to see a film presume to label itself 
under the title of the original without some sort of subsequent note stating that it was based on 
the novel by X, or something of the sort.  They do not pass themselves off as the original itself, 
simply placed into another medium.  I bring up this example not to argue that every interlingual 
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translation should be considered to be based on the original, rather than as a translation of that 
work, but to say that exceptionally liberal translations, such as Ezra’s Pound’s The Book of Odes, 
should do so.  If translators are going to take such license with the original works to the extent 
that they strip them of the foreign context in which they are written, then they are creating a 
distinct work based on that original, rather than modifying it.  Ezra Pound is an extreme example 
of these domesticating practices, but that sort of approach, as I have shown, is the modus 
operandi of the current American publishing industry.  More literal translations are more 
deserving of the title of translation, although not necessarily any more valuable, than fluent 
translations.  Fluent translations certainly have their place; Pound’s poems for instance, are art of 
the highest caliber, but they should be considered to be inspired by or reinterpretations of the 
originals.  I have included for your reference one of the poems from The Book of Odes below, 
along with the original Chinese, and a literal translation of each character in English.  The 
relatively literal translation comes from the work of linguist Bernhard Karlgren, and is followed 















In the seventh month there is the declining Fire-star 
in the ninth month we give out the clothes 
in the days of the first, there is a rushing wind 
in the days of the second, it is bitterly cold 
if we have no robes, no coarse-cloth (garments), wherewith should we finish the year? 
In the days of the third we go to plough 
in the days of the fourth we lift the heels 
all our wives and children carry food (to us) in those southern acres 
the inspector of the fields comes and is pleased. (Karlgren 97) 
 
August sees the heat break 
In October we take our winter wear 
gainst New Year’s wind and March’ cold air, 
lacking serge of wool and hair 
how ‘ld we last till harvest time? 
 
third month: out the plows; 
fourth: toe to field, childer and spouse 
carry our snacks to the south sectors 
where we prepare to meet the inspectors. (Songs 74) 
 
Part 3: Implications 
Many translation theorists, including Derrida, have made mention of the biblical story of 
the Tower of Babel, with good reason, for that parable defines a metaphorical origin of 
translation.  In the story, mankind united under a single language becomes knowledgeable and 
powerful enough to aspire to reach the heavens, so the people begin to build a tower whose apex 
would culminate in the realm of God.  Of course, according to a traditional reading, the wrathful 
Lord of the Old Testament takes issue with this irreverent pursuit of self-elevation and descends 
from the Heavens to cast the uncompleted tower to the ground, and to scatter humanity by means 
of a variety of languages, so that humans could no longer be the powerful unified force that 
attempted to exceed its God-given status. 
Brewer 46 
I would propose a different reading of this story, one in which God’s scattering of the 
people is a blessing rather than a punishment.  If one accepts Derrida’s concept that language is 
not only a means of communication, but also a means of understanding and operating within the 
universe, then the present multitude of languages is more than just a barrier to perfect 
communication.  It is the origin of the foundation of human diversity.  Language is the first 
attribute that allows for difference in thought and comprehension; subsequent factors of identity, 
such as religion, can exist only in terms of that attribute.  If that is the case, then God’s actions at 
Babel served to eliminate the myopic single-mindedness of man, the single-mindedness that 
brought them to transgress against God in the first place.  Even if one does not attach deeper 
religious meaning to the Bible, within the confines of the story, acting against God is understood 
to be bad, so God’s intervention is good.  The variation of language and identity is a positive 
development for man, despite the challenges with communication and divisions between lingual 
groups that resulted.  Indeed, few people who do not pledge allegiance to a dead German dictator 
or run around disguised in outfits that look like a toddler’s ghost costume would argue that 
human diversity is a bad thing. 
Language is both the starting-point for our diversity and a medium through which other 
contributors that contribute to variety find expression and definition.  Therefore, the preservation 
of world languages is fundamental to the preservation of human diversity in general.  I belabor 
this point because modern translation practices, in America at least, do not reflect a desire for 
linguistic and cultural variety.  The Dalkey Archive Press conducted a survey in March of 2011 
that enquired into the current state of translation in English speaking countries, which are: the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  They write, 
citing the Three Percent blog, that “It is a widely accepted estimate that 2-3% of all books 
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published in the US are translations, with only a small percentage of those, perhaps 2%, being 
‘literary’ works “(Research).  As further evidence of English language bias against translation, 
the survey presents data from 22 media organizations from the countries mentioned above.  They 
asked why so few published reviews are of translations.  That data regarding the responses is 
reproduced below (Research). 
Why are translations less often reviewed? 
 
The label for the last column should read “An assumption that the book will not have an 
appeal to a wide enough audience” (Research).  All three possible responses show distaste for 
translated works, and one can see above which factors are considered to be important by each of 
these organizations.  To compound the effects of the English speaking anathema for translation, 
English language literature is translated into other languages disproportionately frequently.  See 
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the specific examples also from Venuti citing C.B. Grannis (1991) (Venuti 14).  One should note 
that these data are close to thirty years old, so it is not ideally up to date.  However, it is likely 
that the trends that are reflected in the chart below still exist today, so the message imparted by 
this data is still relevant to the contemporary situation. 
 
World Translation Publications: from selected languages, 1982-1984. 
 1982 1983 1984 
English 22,280 24,468 22,724 
French 6,205 6,084 4,422 
German 4,501 4,818 5,311 
Russian 6,238 6,370 6,230 
Italian 1,433 1,645 1,544 
Scandinavian* 1,957 2,176 2,192 
Spanish 715 847 839 
Classical, Greek, Latin 839 1,116 1,035 
Hungarian 703 665 679 
Arabic 298 322 536 
Japanese 208 222 204 
Chinese 159 148 163 
World Totals 52,198 55,618 52,405 
*Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, and Islandic 
 
These data alone show a clear imbalance between the flow of cultural works in and out of the 
United States and other English speaking countries.  English speaking countries are exerting a 
sort of cultural imperialism upon other regions, while at the same time absorbing only a 
negligible, and easily ignored, sum of foreign cultural influence. 
To compound the inequality of cultural influence caused by the disparate flow of 
translated texts in and out of the United States, the works that do manage to be translated into 
American English are typically forced through the wringer of American domestication and 
emerge as more a reflection of America than of the original culture.  This process serves to 
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“provide readers with the narcissistic experience of recognizing their own culture in a cultural 
other” (Venuti 15).  Looking back at the specific translated texts discussed in the previous 
section, this transformation should be clear, but I think that one more example would show the 
extremity to which America in particular has taken the practice of domestication.  The Harry 
Potter Series by J.K. Rowling is among the bestselling and most adored series of novels ever 
written.  It has inspired in the mainstream audience the sort of behavior that one would expect 
from the fans of a cult classic.  It can be considered one of the most important works of English 
writing in recent memory, although perhaps not by those whose literary snobbery precludes them 
from including children’s books as a part of the literary canon.  However, these culturally 
noteworthy works of English writing were actually translated for the American audiences.  The 
title of the first novel was published originally in London as The Philosopher’s Stone, but was 
subsequently published in America as The Sorcerer’s Stone.  Beyond that, small translations 
were made throughout the texts, such as changing the word “shan’t” to “won’t” (see the example 
below).  The first version is from the original English text (although the actual text was 
published in Canada), while the second version is from the American publication. 
She told him over dinner all about Mrs Next Door’s problems with her daughter and how 
Dudley had learned a new word (‘Shan’t’) (Philosopher’s 10). 
 
She told him over dinner all about Mrs. Next Door’s problems with her daughter and how 
Dudley had learned a new word (‘Won’t’) (Sorcerer’s 6). 
 
It is quite disturbing that American society has become so culturally ignorant and unaccepting 
that we now find the need to translate English into English.  British English is now too foreign to 
enter the United States without modification; only American English is acceptable for American 
readerships. 
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This American ethnocentrism has led modern translators to aim for “invisibility,” a term 
and idea put forward by Lawrence Venuti in his book The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of 
Translation.  Venuti describes this concept by saying, 
A translated text … is judged acceptable by most publishers, reviewers, and readers when 
it reads fluently, when the absence of any linguistic or stylistic peculiarities makes it 
seem transparent, giving the appearance that it reflects the foreign writer’s personality or 
intention or the essential meaning of the foreign text- the appearance, in other words, that 
the translation is not in fact a translation, but the ‘original.’ (Venuti 1) 
 
This process is the cultural wringer that I mentioned above, and its absurdity should be readily 
apparent.  Even if one flat out rejects the content of the theoretical portion of this thesis, it must 
be accepted that a work undergoing any form of translation, is being “transformed,” as Venuti 
writes (Venuti 1).  An entity that has undergone a transformation will necessarily be different 
from its original form, so a “transparent” translation may give the illusion that it mirrors the 
original, but it cannot.  In fact, in the struggle to create a farce of a perfect copy, the translation 
will be removed farther from the original work than it would have been had the translator opted 
for a less domesticating approach.  A so-called “invisible” translation is less a transparent 
window into the original, and more an opaque concealment that hides that work behind a 
bastardized replacement. 
The cultural implications of this approach were touched on earlier in this section, but 
their gravity should not be understated.  By insisting that translations read fluently in English, 
even American English, American readerships and publishers are essentially insisting upon the 
removal of the foreign in a text.  This superimposition of an American context above the original 
context creates, or perhaps perpetuates, a hierarchy in which foreign cultures and languages are 
seen to be subservient to those of the United States.  A fitting analogy would be New Yorkers 
insisting that someone with the southern drawl of Savannah, Georgia speak with a Brooklyn 
Brewer 51 
accent.  The unfortunate southerner would likely be offended, justifiably feeling that his identity 
was being looked down upon.  Indeed, that feeling of cultural superiority is displayed by the 
American policy of domesticating translation.  In rejecting such foreignness, Americans reveal 
their breathtaking xenophobia, and yet these practices are considered perfectly mundane.  Few 
people bat an eye at this level of blatant ethnocentrism, which would cause an uproar in a context 
other than translation.  The American policy on translation is certainly in need of a dramatic 
reversal from extreme domestication to some form of foreignization. 
These American, ethnocentric translation practices are a part of the ongoing process of 
cultural imperialism that is working to homogenize the world’s people.  Politically powerful 
nations, like the United States, are propagating their social and cultural identities at the expense 
of less politically dominant cultures.  As Venuti writes, “foreign publishers have exploited the 
global drift toward American political and economic hegemony in the postwar period, actively 
supporting the international expansion of Anglo-American culture” (Venuti 15).  Consider the 
international popularity of McDonald’s and Starbucks, for example.  The consumption of 
American products, in this case restaurants, involves the consumption of American culture, 
rather than more local fare.  It seems that one of the major aspects of cultural variety, language, 
is adversely affected by this cultural imperialism.  For instance, approximately 155 Native 
American languages are still spoken in the United States, after many, perhaps hundreds, were 
lost during the European colonization of the continent (Krauss).  Of those 155, linguist Michael 
Krauss states that 135 are spoken only by adults, who are not teaching the language to the 
younger generation (Krauss).  To make the term absolutely clear, a language is extinct when it no 
longer has any fluent speakers.  Even more concerning is a claim by Chinese professor and poet 
Luo Qingchun which predicts that 90% of modern languages will be extinct by 2050 (Qingchun).   
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The projected loss of 90% of the world’s languages is startling, but it becomes even more 
so when one considers the concept of the nature of language explored by Derrida and Sapir and 
Whorf.  If language is indeed the fundamental basis for identity and perception, then we stand to 
lose not only hundreds or thousands of systems of communication, but also hundreds or 
thousands of perspectives on the universe.  In terms of my reinterpretation of the Babel story, we 
will lose the gift of diversity bestowed upon us by God.  I cannot overstate the horrifying nature 
of the prospect.  One could argue that this dramatic homogenization of humanity would be 
beneficial, that it would break down the divides between societies that contribute to the 
instigation of war and other forms of conflict, and that it would lead to a more mutually 
understanding world community.  I will not deny that as a possible consequence, although I think 
that humans will always find a reason to fight each other, but that discussion is not particularly 
relevant to this thesis, so I will pursue it no further.   
Accepting that these benefits will indeed occur, they will be achieved at what cost?  The 
projected diminishing of conflict will occur as a result of the eradication of the cultural variety.  
If this process were to be carried to its theoretical end, then there would be peace only because 
everyone is largely the same.  Of course, language is only the foundation of variety; even if the 
planet was monolingual, there would be variety based on other, more superficial, factors, but 
those factors would all be understood according to the same set of parameters.  Some diversity 
would clearly be lost if that were the case.  The consequences of such a thorough loss of cultural 
variety would extend to essentially everything, to art, cuisine, music, film, philosophy, and etc.  
The boundaries of human thought would shrink as these identities were lost.  One could still 
argue that a more peaceful world outweighs these costs, but I believe that the fundamental 
diversity provided by language is well worth increased conflict based on cultural differences.  
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Certainly the minor benefit of increased ease of communication is dwarfed by the importance of 
diversity.   
These widespread cultural and imperialistic implications of translation may seem 
farfetched to some readers, but they are quite real, and their import has been recognized by 
people for centuries.  The Spanish missionaries and conquistadors in the island system that is 
now known as the Philippines very consciously utilized the relationship between the Spanish and 
native languages (Tagalog for instance) to further their religious and cultural conversion 
agendas.  It is important first to establish that these missionaries were not merely attempting to 
spread Christianity, but also the European ideals and way of life that they brought with them.  
For example, the indigenous people on the islands that these early explorers and missionaries 
encountered lived primarily in small decentralized villages that survived on subsistence farming.  
As John Leddy Phelan writes in his 1959 book, The Hispanization of the Philippines, “As heirs 
of Greco-Roman urbanism, the Spaniards instinctively identified civilization with the city…It 
was only through this daily social contact with other men that he might hope to achieve a 
measure of his potentiality” (Phelan 44).  In accordance with this system of values, and in part to 
increase missionary accessibility to the people, the Spanish attempted to institute a program of 
mass relocation, moving people from their homes in these small villages to city centers (Phelan 
45).  This goal met with only limited success, but the culturally imperialistic intentions are clear. 
Now that we have established that the Spanish desired both religious and cultural 
conversion, the role of language can be analyzed.  The missionaries were quick to recognize that 
success in conversion would be dramatically advanced if sermons and lessons were given in the 
local vernacular, so they developed guides to the local languages, particularly Tagalog, that 
discussed grammar and vocabulary.  However, in these guides Latin and Castilian were “the 
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principal points of reference in reconstructing Tagalog grammar” (Rafael 324).  In other words, 
the grammatical and other linguistic structures of Tagalog were defined and expressed in the 
framework of the romance languages of the missionaries.  As Vincente L. Rafael writes in his 
essay Confession, Conversion, and Reciprocity in Early Tagalog Colonial Society, 
In order to use Tagalog as a tool of conversion, the missionary writers, it seems, had first 
to determine its parts.  But they did so precisely by relocating the native language in the 
complex grid of Latin and Castilian discourse.  The linguistic apparatus of Latin and 
Castilian were made to act on Tagalog, precipitating it as a useful instrument for 
evangelization (Rafael 324). 
 
The Spanish were essentially attempting to transform local religion and culture into something 
close to their own by means of first appropriating the local language and putting it in their own 
terms.  Language was the first aspect of cultural identity to be converted, and was then used as a 
tool to convert the others.  This same process is mimicked, perhaps less intentionally, by the 
imperialistic powers of today.  Linguistic imperialism is the precursor of and the foundation for 
cultural imperialism.  To emphasize this point one last time, I have included the frontispiece of 
the work Conquista de las Islas Filipinas, by Gaspar de San Agustin.  It illustrates the Spanish 
notion that the Word of God was reflected or refracted by the Spanish missionaries and 
conquistadors for the consumption of the people of the Philippines (de San Agustin). 
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Venuti advocates for this shift in translation policy towards foreignization based largely 
on the need to curb rampant cultural imperialism.  He focuses primarily on these political 
ramifications of translation, writing “insofar as foreignizing translation seeks to restrain the 
ethnocentric violence of translation, it is highly desirable today, a strategic intervention in the 
current state of world affairs” (Venuti 20).  I have no issue with his advocacy of the advancement 
of foreignization; however, I believe that such a political motive should not be the sole basis 
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upon which translation practices are instituted.  A translator should be concerned only with 
placing, to the best of his or her ability, a text into the words and terms of another language while 
remaining faithful to the original.  He or she should be answerable only to the text itself, and 
should not bear in mind political considerations while attempting translation.  Let theorists, 
researchers, and politicians be concerned with the political and social implications of translation 
practices; the translator should focus solely on the texts.  However, the best translations must 
necessarily be foreignizations, so the beneficial political consequences would just be a nice 
bonus for the adherence to foreignization. 
From an analysis of the aim of the translator, the question of the precise status of the 
translator is raised.  Venuti correctly asserts that translators in America today are essentially 
expected to rewrite the original text, while the artisanship that is required of such a pursuit is 
entirely ignored, and translators are often recognized only in a footnote on the dust jacket or 
inside cover.  They are expected to be artists but are treated as practicalities.  Venuti argues that 
translators should be regarded as artists in their own right, to the extent that they should be 
considered co-authors of their works.  I would dispute that proposition on the grounds that every 
bit of the translator’s authorship that is manifested in the translation is an unacceptable departure 
from the original work.  The translator should therefore aim to be the medium through which the 
original passes through without modification.  This is of course quite impossible in perfect form; 
a translator can as much remove him or herself from the translation as an author can remove him 
or herself from the original.  That being said, the translator should still aim to be a perfect 
imitator, rather than the creator that marks the standard conception of an artist.  However, I 
would argue that this sort of sophisticated imitation requires an extraordinary level of artistry 
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when done well.  In sum, a translator should be considered an imitator, not an author, but that 
function places the translator well within the profession of an artist. 
After all of this discussion of the potential for destruction and ethnocentrism inherent in 
translation, not to mention the impossibility of a perfect translation, one may doubt whether 
people should translate at all.  The answer is, of course, yes we should translate.  Translation, in 
a general sense, permits communication across language barriers.  Without it, there could be no 
fruitful interaction between cultures with different languages.  Interlingual communication is 
indispensable to the modern world.  It may be a better question to ask whether or not literature 
should be translated.  Again, the answer is a definitive yes.  The translation of literature allows 
for an understanding of another culture that could not otherwise be gleaned by those without 
personal access to that group.  It would certainly be ideal if these readerships learned the 
languages of the original works, but that is clearly not feasible.  So, we are stuck with translation 
if we want any insight into foreign perspectives at all, and it is of course desirable and admirable 
to broaden one’s own perspective by investigating that of others.  To mitigate the damages linked 
to translation, humanity, particularly the portions of it that reside in the United States, should 
improve their policies on translation.  They should cease the current practices that insist upon the 
removal of the foreign in a work, and instead practice a form of foreignization, which would best 
serve both the transmission of the original work, as well as the promotion and enrichment of the 
more macroscopic interactions between cultures and languages. 
Conclusion 
I considered ending this thesis with some sort of call to action, a discussion about 
possible ways to correct this burgeoning, destructive, English speaking hegemony.  But after a 
moment’s thought, I realized that it would take nothing less than a complete modification of the 
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way people think of diversity to fix this problem.  People would need to reject the omnipresent 
humanism that makes them presume that the people of other cultures and languages are like them 
in some fundamental way.  The popular concept of language, which holds that the varied 
languages are just different ways of expressing the same concepts, must be overthrown.  It is 
language that defines concepts, so one language could not be equipped to communicate the 
concepts defined by another.  Accepting this, one can see that the way in which speakers of 
different languages view the universe as essentially different.  The humanism that informs an 
English speaking perspective on other cultures is baseless, but changing something so ingrained 
in the thinking of a group is likely a lost cause. 
It would perhaps be more realistic to first tackle one of the consequences of such 
thinking, one that perpetuates that ethnocentric perspective, namely domesticating translation.  If 
translators, and the publishing industry as a whole, became more accepting of foreignizing 
translations, that would be a big step towards addressing America’s cultural imperialism.  First, 
more foreign works should be translated into English; that imbalance of cross-cultural 
consumption, as outlined by Venuti and the Dalkey Archive Press’s Report quoted above, must 
be the initial step.  Even if those translations undergo the disfiguring process of domestication, it 
would still be progress in the right direction to expose American readerships to even adulterated 
versions of foreign works.  Accomplishing that, the actual translation practices that do so much 
damage to the original works must be corrected.  This would of course require the American 
audiences to become more accepting of foreign elements in their reading.  In the examples 
section of this thesis, I discussed various choices and approaches that I considered to be 
foreignizing, and several of them could be instituted without major disruptions to the 
understanding of the audiences.  For example, changing the word order of sentences in order to 
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reflect the original Spanish might lead to slight loss of clarity in English, but not irreparable loss 
of comprehensibility.  The transition would certainly need to be a slow process, allowing for an 
acclimatization of sorts for the English readers, but it does not strike me as infeasible. 
The consequences of not addressing this cultural imperialism have been argued at length 
in several sections of this thesis.  Languages will continue to die, leaving only prominent world 
languages such as English, Chinese, Arabic, and Spanish.  This mass extinction of language will 
correspond to a cultural mass extinction as well, and together those two destructions will cause 
significant homogenization within humanity.  Antagonists, real and fictional, would smile at the 
seeming inevitability of people growing to think and perceive more and more uniformly.  Putting 
aside the simple distress of seeing the widespread death of once thriving cultures, the decrease in 
human diversity will have many unforeseeable consequences.  Few people would argue that 
diversity is not of eminent importance, so this ongoing series of extinctions must be fought. 
I suppose then my call to action, if that expression is even appropriate, is that people, 
Americans in particular, must stop valuing convenience and familiarity above diversity.  I think 
that it is particularly telling that American readerships would rather have a work that is easy to 
read, that does not challenge their notions of identity and perspective, than a work that informs 
them about the views of another culture.  Languages and cultures are being lost because of this 
laziness and arrogant, self-assured ignorance.  The issue at the core of all of these problems is the 
ethnocentric complacency of the English speaking powers; to completely and permanently fix 
everything discussed in this thesis, it is this aspect of the English speaking identity that must be 
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